The leadership of powerful states in processes of regional institutionalization is a significant, though still widely ignored topic in the field of International Relations (IR). This 
This study inquires as to the prerequisites of effective leadership in international institutionbuilding, using China's and Japan's roles in East Asian regionalism as an empirical test case.
The Korea Herald once posed the crucial question for the future direction of Asian regionalism: "Which country is capable of taking the lead? It boils down to either China or Japan" (Korea Herald, 10 October 2002) . It will be argued that while China has undertaken several initiatives to propel regional free trade agreements (FTA) and economic development of the Indochina region (Swaine/Tellis 2000: 136) , Japan has promoted regionwide institutions such as ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit, playing the role of "Asia's odd man out" (Beeson/Hidetaka 2006) quite productively. Sino-Japanese antagonism and aspirations to leadership on both sides have, in consequence, been a major source of structural change in the region, resulting in a dynamic interplay between bilateral FTA and multilateral institutions.
The structure of the paper will be as follows: First, I will address the problem from the perspective of traditional IR theory and outline common deficiencies. Second, the question of what actually happens when states perform the role of leader will be discussed. Different hypotheses will be presented as to the requirements of effective leadership in international affairs. In the empirical investigation that follows, I will focus on China's and Japan's abilities to lead and argue that China in particular -in spite of its growing material assets -has not met important requirements for successful leadership in multilateral institutional processes.
2
Theoretical Background: Concepts of Leadership
Materialist Versions of Leadership
According to realism (Morgenthau 1967; Waltz 1979 Waltz , 1959 , power capabilities are the determining factor in states' choices. For classical realists, international institutions are always a function of the power and interests of the leading state (Carr 1964: 170-171; Morgenthau 1967: 175) . One strand of theorists in the neorealist vein developed hegemonic-stability theory as a way to link power distribution with the creation and stability of international institutions (e.g., Krasner 1985; Strange 1983) , and to be able to take hold of the concept of leadership in international relations. According to this approach, international institutions are usually created or prevented by dominant powers during periods of hegemony. In contrast, however, other branches of neorealism maintain that relative gains concerns stop states from cooperating with one another. As your friends of today can be your enemies of tomorrow, and the benefits of cooperation can be translated into power capabilities, concerns about the distribution of gains obstruct the possibility of sustained cooperation (Grieco 1990; Mearsheimer 1994) . All in all, the diverse subdivisions of neorealism seem to be contradictory and internally inconsistent with regard to the role of leadership in international politics.
Moreover, hegemony in international politics is a contested concept. It has been common for neorealists to use the term as a synonym for dominance or disproportionately preponderant capabilities (Waltz 1979; Leffler 1992) . It would be rational for a hegemon to use its preponderant power in the interest of the system as a whole, because its immense power only exists relative to the systemic context in which it is embedded. According to hegemonic-stability theory, a (regional or global) hegemon can contribute to securing the peace and stability of the international system and make available other public goods, for example, in the international economy (Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1989) . What is surprising is that the hegemon is thought to supply public goods at a relatively high cost to itself because of free riding by others (Olson 1971; Oneal and Diehl 1994) .
According to this view, the requirements for long-term hegemony are:
-the willingness to acquire supremacy in terms of military power, and the readiness to use military force to solve international conflicts;
-the provision of support for the institutionalization of a regional and/or global free trade system;
-the provision of a stable and liquid reserve currency;
-and the willingness to act as a lender of last resort in financial crises.
On the basis of these basic requirements, hegemons of course try to exercise power over other states. However, attempts at assessing the hegemon's significance in the provision of public goods have brought up no support for hegemonic-stability theory (Keohane 1984; Mansfield 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001; Spiezio 1990 ). Hegemony might be episodically effective in providing public goods, but in the long term it results in an international system that is inherently unstable, and -like monopolistic behavior in economic theory -highly vulnerable to opportunism.
In a similar vein, power-transition theory makes interesting claims, but so far suffers from a lack of empirical scrutiny, with only a few recent exceptions (Lemke 2002; Tammen et al. 2000; Rapkin 2003; Feng 2006; Tammen 2006) . The theory revolves around three arguments (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Lemke eds., 1996; Kugler and Lemke 2000; Tammen et al. 2000; Lemke 2002; Kugler, Tammen and Efird 2004) : Firstly, the development of the internal wealth of nations has important consequences for international politics; secondly, the international system is characterized by hierarchy rather than anarchy;
and thirdly, in correspondence with neorealist thinking, relative power and evaluations of the international status quo are important determinants of interstate wars. What sets powertransition theory apart from realism is the emphasis on the international implications of domestic growth (Bussmann and Oneal 2004: 5) . In particular, the realist version outlined by Kenneth Waltz takes a much more static view of the power of states, accentuating instead the structure of the international system and treating states as "black boxes."
Another difference stems from the concept of order in the international system. Whereas neorealism points to the anarchic character of international coordination, power-transition theory maintains that the international system is hierarchically structured because the leading state "or-ders, adjusts, and allocates" (Siverson and Miller 1995: 59) . As a result, it "always benefits disproportionately from any enterprises involving less powerful states, be they friends or foes" (Organski 1968: 358) . The theory also argues that there are regional subhierarchies lurking within the global hierarchical structure (Kim 1991 (Kim , 1992 Lemke 2002; Kugler, Tammen and Efird 2004: 164) . The actions of the regionally dominant power are constrained by the requirements of the regional hierarchy as well as by the actions of global leaders and global major powers.
In contrast to the theory of hegemonic stability, power-transition theory asserts that a hegemonic state gains enormously from its dominant position and that it distributes private goods to its allies in order to secure their support for the international institution it has established (Kugler, Tammen and Efird 2004) . Power-transition theory argues that the dominant state maintains its compelling power above all through the allocation of private benefits to its allies, not through the provision of public goods -military stability, a liberal trading system, etc. -available to all states (Bussmann and Oneal 2004: 3) . Hegemonic-stability theory and power-transition theory agree that superior capabilities are the best assurance of peace and prosperity, but they vary with respect to whether the leading state seeks the support of others by supplying public goods or distributing private benefits.
In the following, I will argue and show empirically that all these theories of leadership demonstrate a limited conception of power, referring to just two elements of Steven Lukes' (1974) famous definition of the term. With Lukes, power has to be understood as having three dimensions: First, power is exercised if A can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do. The second dimension of power concerns the de facto power of the members within a group in the decision-making process. Lukes maintains that the rules within any decision-making system naturally bias the mobilization of resources for competing agendas against some individuals and groups in favor of others. This dimension of power therefore incorporates coercion, influence, authority, force, and manipulation. Third, a state exercises power over another state by influencing, shaping, or determining his wants, beliefs, and understandings about the world. This third dimension -which is entirely neglected by the rationalist approaches discussed here -refers to a process of what we could call discursive hegemony.
Other rationalist approaches to international politics, such as institutionalism and liberalism, also widely ignore this relational and processual perspective on power, due to their statist ontology (Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986) . Therefore, many supposedly neo-institutionalist accounts have adopted categories that exceed the scope originally outlined by authors such as Robert Keohane (1984 Keohane ( , 1989 or Stephen Krasner (1983) . In the following discussion, it will therefore be maintained, in contrast to the rationalist position, that successful leadership in international affairs must take Lukes' third dimension of power into consideration. Power has to be internalized in the intersubjective understandings of the relevant actors. This is the basis of the hegemonic project and the premise for successful collective action between the hegemon and his followers.
Processes of Leadership
To understand leadership, we have to take a closer look at the relational character of international politics. In the approaches outlined above, collective interest is assumed to be a given and hence exogenous to social interaction (see the critique in Wendt 1994: 389; Ruggie 1998: 118-119) . In contrast, in the following I will argue that social interaction ultimately does have transformative effects on interests and identity, because continuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjective meanings. 1
Effective leadership is crucial, since it serves various functions in the negotiation process.
Multilateral negotiations constitute the key method by which states address joint problems and develop standard behavioral norms in world politics. In multilateral negotiations, the more universal the character of an issue is, and the greater the number of the participating states, the more important effective leadership is in order to make the debate move forward toward an accord. This is because the diversity of national interests represented in a particular negotiation corresponds to the number of nation-states involved; the greater the number of countries involved, the more complicated the relationships between their interests will be.
Thus, the presence of leadership is a necessary though not sufficient condition for reaching an agreement (Young 1991: 302) . In other words, as Lindberg and Scheingold have put it, "leadership is the very essence of a capacity for collective action" in multilateral negotiations (Lindberg and Sheingold 1970: 128) . Likewise, Underdal argues that the more multifaceted the negotiation setting -that is, the greater the number of actors and the number and "intricacy" of issues -the more likely it is that some actors will emerge as leaders and others as followers. In this process, critical leadership becomes a determinant of success (Underdal 1994: 179-180 ).
Moreover, leadership theory suggests that decentralized bargaining is subject to collectiveaction problems. This will lead members of an international institution to delegate functions of agenda management, brokerage, and mediation to more powerful countries. Leaders might have the capacity to solve collective-action problems that could otherwise paralyze decentralized negotiations. The delegation of powers to leading countries can be seen as a functional response by states to collective-action problems in multilateral negotiations.
Strong leaders often wield asymmetrical control over preference formation and negotiation procedure. Opportunistic leaders will use this privilege for both collective and private gain, promoting an agreement that is closest to their own preferred position (Tallberg 2006 (Young 1991: 300) .
This corresponds to Susan Strange's distinction between "structural power" and "relational power": While the latter refers to the ability of one state to influence another state's behavior directly, structural power denotes one state's ability to indirectly influence others by delineating the structures within which they must operate (Strange 1983) . In a similar vein, Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that there is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order (Ikenberry/Kupchan 1990: 283) .
This statement gets much closer to reality than the static assumptions presented by materialist approaches to leadership. It refers to the mechanisms that make leadership possible, to the sustainability of compliance by secondary states, and to the likelihood of leadership failure. To accommodate exogenous sources of leadership in the model developed here, one has to ask how material sources are turned into power in international negotiations, since it is assumed that the material power base has no intrinsic significance in itself. This is not to say that material incentives do not play a role in international politics; it rather addresses the question of how material capabilities are used in international politics.
According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, there are two basic ways of exercising leadership: The first involves material incentives, which range from economic sanctions to military strikes at the negative end of the spectrum and promises of reward at the positive end. These methods aim to change the costs and benefits of pursuing alternative policies for potential followers.
The second means of exercising leadership relies on the modification of the basic beliefs of leaders in other nations (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 285) . These two ways of exercising leadership are interrelated and reinforce each other in the political process. In reality, coercion and persuasion take place at the same time. As has been said before, the first method works through external inducement (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 290) ideas about the world.
-H2: Leadership is effective and sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge the leader's vision of international order and internalize it as their own (intersubjectivity).
The hypotheses presented here stress the relational, processual, and interactive character of international relations. Leadership is relational, disputed, and constituted by shared ideas about self, other, and the world, and it relies on the intersubjective internalization of ideas, norms, and identities. Material capabilities and the distribution of benefits can influence intersubjective understandings. Certainly, material conditions, such as the existence of nuclear capabilities, have both constraining and enabling effects on actors' behavior and define the costs and benefits of alternative actions, as Wendt (2000) and Wight (2006) have emphasized.
However, "in acknowledging the independent effects of material conditions it is also important not to lose sight of the discursive conditions that invest them with meaning" (Wendt 2000: 166, emphasis in original) . The meaning of nuclear bombs in the hands of North Korea's dictator Kim Jong-il is different for China than for Japan due to different ideas about self and other. These ideas can only be studied as a discursive phenomenon.
Operationalizing leadership in this way also opens the discussion up to include leaders who operate below the global level, thereby overcoming a major limitation of hegemonic-stability theory, which suggests that hegemons are scarce in regional affairs as well as in particular issue areas. While hegemony is an extreme case, an advantage of the approach developed here lies in its neutrality with regard to the geographic scope or dimension of the subject area. Most importantly though, power can be analyzed by focusing on discourse. Both the impact of material capabilities on intersubjective understandings and the role of a prospective leader's vision in this process can be analyzed entirely within discourse. The discourse will show us where intersubjectivity exists and where it does not, thereby unveiling the abilities of China and Japan to act as leaders in the region.
The empirical analysis will focus on the discourse regarding the establishment and further progress of ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS) from 1997 to 2007. The process is an excellent example of the struggle for hegemony that is going on between China and Japan, since competing visions of the future path of East Asian regionalism become most visible in the process. When it comes to institutional enlargement, the pulling and hauling that we call politics can be observed at its best. In this process, the application of material incentives and persuasion through arguing take place at the same time.
Specifically, I will analyze current discourses over the future path of the "region" as such, looking for possible consequences of these discourses on the power of single states and their influence on the institutionalization of the pan-Asian idea. Discourse will be understood as forming the consciousness of agents. In that sense, it has a major impact on the behavior and actions of states. On the basis of these insights, questions to be asked in the following sections are:
-What are the specific ideas transported by Japan and China?
-What role do material capabilities play in this process?
-What function do specific ideas have for the shaping of the Asian idea?
-How do intersubjective understandings (shared ideas) within the region evolve?
-What impact do intersubjective understandings have on the actual politics of institutionalization?
Ideas are conceptualized as the offspring of the meanings learned and reproduced in a discourse, not their source. Intersubjective understandings make collective action between governments possible. Hence, the speakers in the following empirical analysis are governments, that is, individual politicians or bureaucrats entitled to speak for a state. Sino-Japanese Antagonism and the Struggle for Regional Leadership
In the following, I will argue that the ability to lead is dependent on the capability to form political coalitions. Leadership is mainly a discursive project, relying on intersubjective understandings for collective action to become possible. China has quite successfully pursued its own agenda and focused on bilateral trade liberalization excluding Japan. This in turn has prompted Japan to strengthen its community approach, while relying on FTA as a comple- 
Material Capabilities of China and Japan in the Asian Context
Until the middle of the 1990s and the outbreak of the 1997 financial turmoil, the preoccupa- quarter of East Asia's gross national income of $7,150 billion whereas Japan weighed in with more than half of this income (see Table 1 ). Both China's and Japan's actual future development is far from clear, though, and emphasis will thus be given to discourses regarding the potential role that both countries' material capabilities play in shaping Asia's institutional infrastructure. 2 Considering Japan's economic stagnation, China is now deemed more significant in generating regional economic growth.
However, a widespread concern persists in Southeast Asia that China will increasingly attract FDI at the expense of the ASEAN member countries and that China will aim to expand its leadership role in the region (for a critical discussion see Cheng While some observers see a booming China and a degenerating Japanese economy (Rothacher 2005) , others paint a more complex picture. They argue that the current sources of growth in China, FDI and exports, are unsustainable, since increasing FDI rates run the risk of creating overcapacity and can lead to deflationary pressures while disproportionate reliance on exports exposes the economy to sudden changes in external conditions (Aziz 2006) . What seems clear is that Japan will be seriously affected by low birth rates and an aging population. According to IMF estimates, the changing population and labor force have significant impacts on private investment, consumption, and saving decisions, thereby influencing economic growth. Table 2 ). Without a doubt, China's role as both a recipient and a source of FDI will grow in the near future (for implications see Frost 2004) . Already in 2005, China had significantly increased its trade with ASEAN. Japan's exports to and imports from ASEAN in 2005, however, were still higher than those of China (see Table 3 ). In the first years of the new millennium, Japan remained the world's second largest donor.
During the previous 30 years, it provided more than US$200 billion as part of its official assistance program, primarily to neighboring countries in East and Southeast Asia (see Table 4 ). Japan has supplied ODA to ASEAN member countries for development of the Mekong Region and other underdeveloped areas; transnational issues such as terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters; economic structural reforms; and development of the investment environment. Moreover, Japan has contributed some US$500 million in grant aid to countries af- Together with South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia also voiced some reservations with regard to Zhu's proposal (Cheng 2004: 258) . This in turn prompted the Japanese government's decision to set up a study group on the conclusion of a free trade pact with ASEAN. Observers saw this as a bid to compete with China (Japan Times, 29 April 2001). Japan coined this strategy a "multilevel trading policy," making Japan-China antagonism a central source for structural transformation in the region.
Vision and Intersubjectivity
While China pursued a bilateral agenda, Japan was very active in advancing the multilateral We should ensure that East Asia cooperation grows in a balanced way and brings benefits to all, so that we can, through practical cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels, build strong economic and trade linkages and put in place a cooperation framework based on mutual benefit and drawing on mutual strength (MFAPRC 2007) .
It is, however, interesting to see that China gradually accepted the vision of a larger East Asian Community, yet without developing a clear strategy. As Mohan Malik concludes with regard to China's participation in the EAS: "In fact, China's stance provides valuable insights into Beijing's insecurities and fears regarding the gathering momentum for a broader EAC shifting power alignments within Asia" (Malik 2006: 207-208) . Whereas Japan tried to Relations of difference persistently played a role in Malaysian and Chinese speech-acts. Differences of opinion among ASEAN members in fleshing out the details of the EAS were, however, difficult to overcome in the months after the decision to hold the EAS was made. The distinction between Asians and Australians in particular was emphasized by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir before the first summit meeting in December: "Australia is basically European and it has made clear to the rest of the world that it is the deputy sheriff for America,"
Mahathir told reporters. "Therefore Australia's views would represent not the East, but the views representing the stand of America," he said (National Nine News, 7 December 2005).
Identities were constructed in a purely relational manner. "Who are we?" and "Where do we draw the borders?" were the questions dominating the discourse. It was impossible for the actors participating in the process to answer them dogmatically, for identities are never fully constituted. Neither is power absolute. Contested power is a source of structural change. What is striking about the proposal is the fact that most of the EAS members stated their tentative support for Japan's initiative, while China seemed disinclined. Japan even had to deny allegations that the plan was brought up to counter the growing influence of China in the region (ASEAN Economic Ministers 2006b). However, it is quite apparent that Japan's diplomacy is multidirectional. Japan's active regional foreign policy has also lead led to the To summarize, Japan uses the EAS as a vehicle for pursuing its long-held vision of an East Asian Community (EAC), while China increasingly supports the idea but still emphasizes bilateralism. In 2005, it still seemed that ASEAN+3 would be the primary means of translating the idea of an Asian political community into reality. Since then, institutionalized networks have been growing denser in all directions. In this context, the China-Japan competition for leadership in the region seems to be the primary source of structural change. China even declared it would be ready to host the second EAS, however, this offer was declined by ASEAN. It seems that the processual dynamic of East Asian regionalism has gained strength to such a degree that no country in the region, not even the largest, can stop it now.
Conclusion
Regionalism in East Asia has gained momentum in the last few years. The region is changing from a set of countries that rapidly integrated with the world to one that is forcefully exploiting the dynamism that lies within Asia. Some observers maintain that for the first time an "integral political complex" (Nabers 2004 Leadership is effective and sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge a leader's vision of international order and internalize it as their own. It is often disputed and is constituted by shared ideas about self, other, and the world, relying on the intersubjective internalization of ideas, norms, and identities. The central question refers to the strategies that actors employ to present their particular visions as universal. Material resources and the distribution of benefits can influence intersubjective understandings, but they lack intrinsic meaning. While structural leadership aims to translate relative power capabilities into bargaining leverage by making use of material threats and promises, this is still a discursive phenomenon. Furthermore, the institutionalization of ASEAN+3, and in particular the EAS, cannot be explained in an immediate functional or utilitarian manner, making it impossible to rely on materialist explanations of leadership alone. China especially cannot expect short-term gains from either forum and has therefore pursued a bilateral foreign policy after the Asian Crisis. Now things are moving in directions that were unforeseen and maybe unintended by some countries in the region, including China. This is why I would strongly call into question -on the basis of the empirical findings of this study -the assumption of an a priori leadership role on the part of large countries.
Leadership is relational, subject to the issue in question, and always requires the formation of coalitions. As the examples of ASEAN+3 and the EAS have shown, Japan's diplomacy has been quite successful in that regard. It has thus been construed as a "very distinct and effective form of Japanese leadership" (Hook et al. 2001: 195) , repudiating the hypothesis that China assumes an a priori leadership role in processes of international institutionalization.
